Why the U.S. and Washington Should Not Build High-Speed Rail
June 2009
In February 2009, Congress dedicated $8 billion of stimulus funds to high-speed rail projects. In April, President Obama released his high-speed rail “vision” for America, which includes 8,500 miles that the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) had identified as potential high-speed rail routes in 2001.
In June, the FRA announced its criteria for states to apply for high-speed rail
grants out of the $8 billion in stimulus funds.
Yet the FRA has no estimates how much high-speed rail will ultimately
cost, who will ride it, who will pay for it, and whether the benefits can justify the
costs. A realistic review shows that high-speed rail will be extremely costly and
will add little to American mobility or environmental quality.
The best available data indicate that the FRA plan will cost about $90 billion, or roughly one-fifth the inflation-adjusted cost of the Interstate Highway System that was approved in 1956. This plan will provide trains with average speeds of 140-150 miles per hour (mph) in California, 75-85 mph in Florida, and moderate-speed trains averaging 55-75 mph in Washington and 30 other states.
The average American will ride these trains less than 60 miles per year, or about 1/70th as much as the average American travels on interstate freeways. In fact, most of the taxpayers who pay for high-speed trains will rarely or never use them. Because of a premium fare structure and downtown orientation, the main patrons of high-speed trains will be the wealthy and downtown workers, such as bankers, lawyers, and government officials, whose employers pay the fare.
A true high-speed rail system, with average speeds of 140-150 mph connecting major cities in 33 states, would cost well over $500 billion. Meeting political demands to close gaps in the system could bring the cost close to $1 trillion. At twice the cost of the Interstate Highway System, such a true highspeed rail system would provide less than 1/10th the mobility offered by the interstates.
These costs include only the projected capital costs. States that decide to
build moderate- or high-speed rail might be held responsible for cost overruns,
operating losses, and the costs of replacing and rehabilitating equipment about
every 30 years.
Upgrading Washington tracks from the Oregon to the British Columbia borders to run trains at 110 mph will cost taxpayers roughly $1 billion, or about $150 for every Washington resident. Subsidizing train operations will cost at least $54 million per year. Yet the average Washingtonian will take a round trip on such trains only once every 8.5 years.
Far from being an environmental savior, high- and moderate-speed trains are likely to do more harm to the environment than good. In intercity travel, automobiles are already as energy-efficient as Amtrak, and the energy efficiencies of both autos and airliners are growing faster than trains. The energy cost of constructing new high-speed rail lines will dwarf any operational savings. As the state of Florida concluded in 2005, “the environmentally preferred alternative is the No Build Alternative.”
To add insult to injury, the administration is likely to require states that accept high-speed rail funds to regulate property rights in a futile effort to discourage driving and promote rail travel. These regulations will deny rural landowners the right to develop their land while they make urban housing unaffordable and disrupt neighborhoods through the construction of high-density housing.
For all of these reasons—high costs, tiny benefits, and interference with property rights—Washington should not attempt to provide high-speed rail service. Instead, it should use its share of the $8 billion stimulus funds solely for incremental upgrades, such as safer grade crossings and signaling systems, that do not obligate state taxpayers to pay future operations and maintenance costs.
Key Findings
• Initial funding commits the nation to a program whose eventual costs could exceed $1 trillion. This doesn’t count overruns, operating subsidies, and rehabilitation costs.
• Outside of the Boston-to-Washington and Philadelphia-to-Harrisburg routes, Amtrak shortdistance
trains lose an average of
$37 per passenger and Amtrak
expects the states to cover most
of these operating losses.
• A hidden cost of rail is that it must be rebuilt about every 30 years. This means construction could leave states obligated to fund billions of dollars in rehabilitation costs.
• The fact that American freight railroads are profitable while European passenger lines are not suggests that freight, not passenger, is the highest and best use of a modern railroad in most places.
• It is far more cost-effective to save energy by encouraging people to drive more fuel-efficient cars than to build and operate high-speed rail.
• Considering the energy
required for rail construction,
improvements in auto and airline
energy efficiencies, and the high
energy cost required to move
trains at higher speeds, highspeed
rail will have little to no
environmental benefit.
• Upgrading the 280 rail miles in Washington to 110-mph standards would cost nearly $1 billion.
• The average Washingtonian will take a round trip on high-speed rail once every 8.5 years.
• For every Washingtonian who rides high-speed rail once a month, more than 100 Washington residents will never ride it.
